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Summary findings
Adherents of the "natural trading partner"  hypothesis  Among Schiff's conclusions:
argue that preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are more  *  The home country is better off with a large partner
likely to improve welfare if participating countries  country. First, a large partner  is more likely to satisfy the
already trade disproportionately  with each other.  home country's  import demand at the world price.
Opponents of the hypothesis claim that the opposite is  Second, the home country is likely to gain more on its
true: welfare gains are likely to be greater if participating  exports to a large partner country, because that partner
countries trade less with each other.  is likely to continue  importing from the world market
Schiff shows that neither analysis is correct. The  after formation  of the trading bloc. And since the partner
"natural trading partner"  hypothesis can be rescued if it  charges a tariff on imports from the world  market, the
is redefined in terms of complementarity or  home country is more likely to improve its terms of trade
substitutability in the trade relations of countries, rather  by selling to the partner at the higher tariff-inclusive
than in terms of their volume of trade.  price if the partner  is large.
Schiff asks not whether  a country should form or join  *  The PTA as a whole is likely to be better off if each
a trading bloc but which partner  or partners it should  country imports what the other exports  (rather than each
select if it does join such a bloc,  country importing what the other imports). Losses are
He shows that the pre-PTA volume of trade is not a  similar but less likely, while gains are both more likely
useful criterion for selecting a partner. The pre-PTA  and the same or larger.
volume is equal to zero if the partner is an importer of
the good sold to the home country and it is
indeterminate if the partner is an exporter  of that good.
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The "natural trading partner" hypothesis has recently become popular in the
regional integration literature. Two versions of the hypothesis exist, referring either to the
volume of trade between potential partners or to the distance and transport costs between
them. Authors who adhere to the hypcithesis  argue that integration with "natural trading
partners" is likely to raise welfare because the likelihood  and extent of trade diversion is
minimized when the volume of trade between prospective  partners is large. Others argue
the opposite. And though it is true that the "natural trading partner" hypothesis does not
hold in general, the studies aiming to refute it have some analytical  problems  of their own
which have so far been ignored in the literature.
This paper shows that the analysis requires a more careful examination of the link
between the partner country and the rest of the world, and that such an examination leads
to different results. It is shown that commercial  opportunities do exist which have not
been fully exploited  in the traditional analysis. One of the implications of the analysis
presented here is that an alternative  definition of "natural trading partner" exists under
which the hypothesis is likely to hold.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the "natural trading partner"
hypothesis as found in the literature and Section 2 shows the analysis aimed at refuting it.
Section 3 lists the main implications of that analysis. Section 4 points out its limitations
and presents a new analysis. Section 5 concludes and provides new policy
recommendations. The "natural trading partner" hypothesis is rescued once appropriate
changes in the definition are made.
21. The "Natural Trading Partner" Hypothesis
A number of studies claim that if two countries or regions are "natural trading
partners", they are more likely to gain from a preferential  trade agreement (PTA) between
them. The claim---based  on the version of the hypothesis referring to the volume of trade-
--apparently  originates with Lipsey (1960). He argues in his famous survey that "...  a
customs union is more likely to raise welfare the higher is the proportion of trade with the
country's union partner and the lower the proportion with the outside world." In a similar
vein, Summers (1991) states: "Are trading blocs likely to divert large amounts of trade?
In answering this question,  the issue of natural trading blocs is crucial because to the
extent that blocs are created between countries that already trade disproportionately,  the
risk of large amounts of trade diversion  is reduced". Also, Wonnacott  and Lutz (1989)
state that if the prospective members are already major trading partners, integration
"...will  be reinforcing natural trading patterns, not artificially  diverting them" (p. 69).
The same point is made in a 1995 communication  from the EU Commission to the EU
Council entitled "Free Trade Areas: An Appraisal" which states that PTAs between
"natural trading partners" are less likely to generate  trade diversion effects.
What about the version of the hypothesis associated with location and transport
costs? Wonnacott and Lutz (1989) argue that, ceteris paribus, since proximity between
PTA members increases  trade between them (due to lower transport costs), it reduces the
extent of trade diversion and increases  the benefits of PTAs, a point also made by
Deardorff and Stern (1994). Krugman (1993, pp. 63, 64) argues that due to transportation
and communication  costs, there is a strong tendency for countries to trade with their
neighbors. And if free trade agreements  (FTAs) are formed with neighbors, the gains
3from freeing intra-regional  trade will be larger and the losses of reducing interregional
trade will be smaller than if these costs are ignored. Similarly,  Krugman (1991) states that
"If a disproportionate  share of world trade would take place within trading blocs even in
the absence of any preferential trading arrangement,  then the gains from trade creation
within blocs are likely to outweigh any possible losses from external trade diversion."
Though being the most popular,  the definition  of "natural trading partners" based
on the volume of trade criterion is difficult to justify. The volume of trade does not
necessarily provide an objective  measure of the extent to which trading partners are
"natural". The reason is that the volume of trade is itself affected by trade policy. Ideally,
we would like to have a "natural trading partners" criterion  that is independent  of trade
policy. Such a criterion is proposed in this paper.
Note also that if losses to a PTA depend on the extent of trade diversion, this is
not necessarily true for individual memnbers  who may lose or gain from the redistribution
of tariff revenues within the PTA even in the absence of trade diversion. This is the heart
of the challenge of the traditional analysis to the "natural trading partner" hypothesis.
2. Traditional Analysis'
An early non-technical  critique of the "natural trading partner" hypothesis is
Bhagwati (1993) who details the shortcomings  of the hypothesis as expounded by
Krugman and Summers. More formal.  analyses include Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996),
Michaeli (1998), Panagariya (1995, 1996, 1997, 1999) and Schiff (1997). Most studies
The term "traditional" for this type of analysis is also found in the title of Panagariya (1999).
4use a partial equilibrium approach,  while Michaeli (1998) uses a diagrammatic general
equilibrium framework  to obtain the same results. As stated in Bhagwati and Panagariya
(p. 35), Michaeli (p. 74) and Schiff (p. 363), the studies of PTAs focus on FTAs. This
paper examines customs unions (CUs) as well. The standard  analysis typically assumes
three countries, the home country A, the partner country B and the rest of the world C, as
well as perfect competition and homogeneity. 2 In the pre-PTA situation, A imposes an
MFN tariff on imports of B and C. The same assumptions are made in our analysis in
Section 4.
Under homogeneity,  an absolute gain from forming  a PTA for small countries can
only occur if they stop trading with the rest of the world. A welfare gain can be obtained
without having to assume such corner solutions if one assumes product differentiation,
for instance---following  Arnington---by country of origin. Though this assumption
provides additional flexibility, it does so at a cost. With product differentiation,  each
country has monopoly power in the good it produces and free trade is no longer optimal
for the country or region. Homogeneity is assumed in the remainder of the paper.
2.1. Small in all markets.
The first case considered  is the Vinerian constant cost model, where the home
country A is small relative to both B and C and takes their prices as given. As is well
2  Bhagwati  and  Panagariya  (1996)  and  Panagariya  (1997)  also  examine  the case  of heterogeneous
products.  The  latter  one is based  on the Meade  model,  where  each  of the three  countries  produces  one
good  and imports  the other  two,  with  similar  results  about  the impact  of the volume  of trade  on the effect
of a PTA.  The  paper  concludes  (p. 487):  "It may  be asked  whether  the results  remain  valid  in models  of
product  differentiation  and economies  of scale.  The broad  answer  is in  the affirmative."  In Meade's
model,  the partner  exports  to the home  country  and  to the rest  of the world.  This  paper  examines,  under
5known, if B has lower costs than C, B is the only supplier to A inthe pre-PTA situation
and a PTA with B is equivalent to unilateral liberalization,  with A benefiting from the
traditional gains from trade. This is a case of pure trade creation. Given B's constant cost,
its welfare is not affected, and the welfare gain of the PTA as a whole equals that of A.
Since C's welfare is also unaffected,  the world's welfare gain equals that of A as well.
If B has higher costs than C (but not higher costs than C inclusive of A's tariff),
then C is the only supplier to A in the pre-PTA situation. With a PTA between A and B,
imports from B displace imports frorn C in A's market. A's terms of trade deteriorate and
it loses a (large) rectangular area frorm  trade diversion  whose size depends on the cost
difference  between B and C and on the initial level of imports. A also gains a (typically
smaller) triangular area because the lower market price results in some trade creation. The
net effect is (presumably)  negative. The same holds for the PTA's and the world's
welfare.
We now examine  the case where B has an upward-sloping  supply curve of exports to
A, denoted by SB  in Figure L.' C's supply to A is horizontal  as before. Thus, A is large in
B's market but is small in the world market C. We examine first the case where A forms
a PTA with B and then the alternative  case where A forms a PTA with C.
homogeneity,  the case of the partner exporting to the home country and either exporting to the rest of the
world or importing from it.
3  1  show in Section 4 that this supply curve does not exist.
62.2. Large (small) in partner's (outside) market.
Before the PTA is formed, A applies a non-discriminatory  (MFN) specific tariff
T, and faces the supply curves S'c from C and S'B from B (see Figure 1). A imports M,
from B and M3 - Ml from C. The price in A, PAS  is: PA =  PC  + T. A's welfare is the
difference HKVE between the value of imports and the world price paid for them. This
equals the consumer surplus HKF + tariff revenues KVEF. B's welfare is FQW = EJP.
With a PTA between A and B, S'B increases to SB  while S'c is unchanged. A's imports
from B increase to M2 and those from C fall to M 3 - M2. Since A no longer charges  the
tariff T on imports from B, it loses rectangle EFGI. And this loss increases with the
volume of trade. On the other hand, B's producer surplus increases by EFGJ. And B's
gain increases with the volume of trade as well. Note that EFGJ < EFGI. Thus, the loss
to A is larger than the gain to B. The reason is trade diversion:  M1M2 was previously
imported from C and is now imported from B at a higher cost (along JG rather than JI).
And there is no trade creation: the marginal  unit is still imported from C at the same cost
PA=  PC  + T so that total imports remain unchanged.
2.3. Small (large) in partner's (outside)  market.
Finally, with a PTA between A and C, A faces Sc from C rather than S'c. Then,
PA= PC  and A gains area KLV + EFRN (tariff revenue collected on imports from outsider
B). Welfare of C is unchanged so that the PTA as a whole (A plus C) gains KLV +
EFRN. And B loses EFQN. Note that here too, the larger the imports from the partner
(country C), the smaller the tariff revenues  obtained from outsider B and the smaller A's
gains and the PTA's gains. Though A and the PTA gain in this case, the gainsfall as A's
7imports from the partner increase. The impact on world welfare is KLV + EFRN -
EFQN = KLV (trade creation)  - RQN (trade diversion),  and may be positive or negative.
This case is examined in detail in Bhagwati and Panagariya  (1996, pp. 46-47) and
in Schiff (1997, pp. 366-367).  These staidies  have several shortcomings,  one of which is
examined here (and the others in Section  4). They assume that country B continues to
export to A after A forms a PTA with C.  Since  the domestic price in A falls to Pc, B
obtains Pc - T in A's market but obtains  Pc in C's market. 4 Thus, B will switch its
exports from A to C, and the above results do not hold. In fact, A gains KLV but not
EFRN, B's welfare is unchanged, the wvorld  gains KLV, and A's and the PTA's gains are
invariant with respect to A's pre-PTA imports from the partner.
3. Main Implications from the Traditional Analysis
Four main implications that have been drawn from the traditional analysis are:
i) The losses to A from a PTA with B do not depend only on the degree of trade diversion
MXM 2. They are also affected  by the revenue loss (or worsening of the terms of trade) on
the initial import level Ml. In fact, A loses tariff revenue even in the total absence of trade
diversion, with SB  vertical at level MI,
ii) A PTA between two small price-taking  countries must result in a welfare loss for the
PTA as a whole as long as trade with the rest of the world C continues to take place.
There is no trade creation in this case and the only effect is trade diversion.
4  The results do hold if C imposes  an import tariff larger than or equal to T. Wonnacott and Wonnacott
(1981) assume such a tariff in their analysis of regional integration.  In this paper, I assume C imposes  no
tariff on imports  and the good can be bought or sold at price Pc on the world market C.
8iii) The loss to A is proportional to the post-PTA imports from B. Thus, the greater the
imports from B, the greater A's losses. This is the basis for the challenge  to the "natural
trading partner" hypothesis. Of course, this only deals with the import side. Clearly, the
gains to A rise with the volume of A's exports to B. There are thus two contradictory
effects and the impact of the volume of trade on the effect of a PTA on A's welfare is
ambiguous a priori.
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996, pp. 47-48) argue that in the case of North-South
PTAs (e.g., NAFTA), since the North typically has lower trade barriers than the South,
the South gives more to the North than it receives from it, and thus loses from the PTA.
According to this argument, ceteris paribus, the South (e.g., Mexico) is better off forming
a PTA with a distant Northern region (e.g., the EU or Japan) than with one nearby (e.g.,
the US) because the welfare loss for the South is smaller if trade with the partner country
is lower. In general, a country gains more from a PTA if its tariffs are low while those of
the partner are high, and if it imports little from the partner and exports a lot to it (Schiff
1997).
iv) We have seen that for a PTA made up of countries A and B, the loss for the PTA as a
whole is JIG. As long as the slope of SB  is constant, this loss is independent  of its
location. Thus, a higher volume of trade does not reduce the PTA's loss from trade
diversion. Assuming that the elasticity rather than the slope of B's supply curve is
constant, the extent of trade diversion  rises with the volume of trade. Then, the losses to
the PTA as a whole increase  with the volume of trade (Schiff 1997). This is precisely the
opposite of the prediction from the "natural trading partner" hypothesis.
9Implications  i), iii) and iv) also hold when A is large in both B and C, i.e., when
both SB  and Sc are upward-sloping  (Schiff 1997).
4. The Reality of Commercial Opportny
The standard analysis carefully  examines the trade relationship  between A and B
and between A and C. The same cannot be said of the trade relationship  between B and
C. This lacuna has a fundamental  impact on the results. An alternative  analysis is
provided in this section. 5
4.1. Small in all markets.
We start with the constant cost model where A takes prices in both B and C as
given. A question that arises is how the two prices of B and C can coexist. If, say, Pc <
PB,  C can sell to B.  If C is large relative to B, the equilibrium price is Pc; if B is large
relative to C, the equilibrium price is PB;  and otherwise  it is between PB  and Pc. The main
point is that A will face a single price on the world market and is then indifferent  whether
it forms a PTA with B or C. Such a I'TA is equivalent  to unilateral liberalization.
To maintain the standard  results, one needs to assume that there is no such
arbitrage between countries B and C. This is obtained if the country with the higher cost
applies a tariff that is larger than or equal to the difference  in costs between B and C. In
We maintain the assumption of the traditional analysis that tariff rates are given exogenously. For an
analysis of endogenous deternination of tariff rates, see Grossman  and Helpman (1994, 1995),  Cadot, de
Melo, Olarreaga (1996) and Olarreaga ard Soloaga (1998).
10this particular case, the correction  is simple and all the standard results continue to hold.
This is not the case below.
4.2. Large (Small) in partner's (outside)  market.
Assume now, as done in Section 2, that A is small in world market C but is large
in B's market. B is small in C's market as well. We now need to specify  the trade
relationship between B and C. The good is either exported from B to C (Section 4.2.1) or
imported from C to B (Section 4.2.2).
4.2.1. B exports to C.
There are three destinations for B's output: A's market, C's market, and B's
domestic consumers. What is the nature of B's export supply curve to A?  Since B can
export to C at price Pc, its export supply to A is zero for any price PA  < PC.  At PA  = Pc' B
is indifferent between exporting  to C or to A. For PA> PC)  B sells all its exports in A and
none in C. There are thus three segments  to B's export supply curve. In Figure 1, the first
segment starts at the origin and is equal to zero up to point E.  The second segment is
horizontal at price Pc from point E to (say) point Z.  The third segment is upward sloping,
from (say) point Z to point U and continuing up as shown by the curve XB.  Thus, B's
export supply curve is not SB  in Figure 1.
As long as B exports to C, whether A and B form a CU or a FTA has no impact
on the analysis since B's tariff does not apply. Before B forms a PTA with A, B receives
the world price Pc on its exports to C and on its exports to A as well (the price in A is PA
=  Pc + T and B pays a tariff T on exports to A). B is therefore indifferent  between
11exporting to C or to A. Consequently,  the volume of exports from B to A is
indeterminate  (and not volume M 1 in Figure 1 as obtained in the standard analysis).  This
indeterminacy  is of no consequence  f:*or  the analysis of the welfare impact of the PTA.
Assume now that A and B fo:rm  a PTA. The standard  analysis assumes a move
along B's export supply curve SB  from point J to point G in Figure 1, with an increase in
B's exports to A from Ml to M 2. In i-act,  since B is exporting to C at price Pc, and can
now obtain a price Pc + T in A's market, B's exporters  simply switch exports from C's
market to A's market. B's export supply curve to A following integration is thus identical
to Sc---at  least up to the point where all exports are sold in A's market and none in C's
market or exports equal M 4.
From the viewpoint of A and1  B's welfare, where the export supply curve starts
sloping upwards is crucial. First, if that happens at or beyond voluMe  M4 (point L), A
gains KLV as in the case of unilateral liberalization,  B's welfare is unchanged, and the
PTA gains KLV. Note that the likelihood of reaching that point is higher under our
analysis than under the standard  one given that B can switch exports from C to A.
Second, assume B's export supply curve intersects A's import demand curve
between K and L (as shown by the curve XB  in Figure 1). Then, B gains from the higher
export price while the impact on A is ambiguous:  it loses from a worsening of its terms of
trade but gains from the lower price and increased trade (trade creation).  For instance, if
the export supply curve XB  intersects the import demand curve in point U in Figure 1, A's
gain is FKUX (increase in consumer  surplus) and the loss is EFKV (loss in tariff
revenue), or a net gain of KUO and a net loss of EXOV. The net loss EXOV is likely to
be larger than the net gain KUO because the net loss applies to the entire pre-PTA
12volume of imports while the net gain only applies  to the increase in imports. However,
whether A gains or loses also depends on where U is located  on the segment KL. If U is
close to L, A is likely to gain; otherwise it will lose. B gains EXUZ.
Third, assume the export supply curve XB  intersects the horizontal section FK to
the left of K. Then, A's domestic price continues to be Pc + T. A loses tariff revenue to B
(i.e., A's terms of trade worsen). Such an outcome is less likely than in the standard
analysis because of the larger export supply from B to A in our analysis (XB  is located
further to the right than SB  due to B's ability to shift its exports from C to A). However,
for the same reason, A loses more in this case than in the standard analysis and B gains
more.
What about the impact on the PTA as a whole? In the first case where XB
intersects A's demand curve at point L, the bloc gains KLV. In the second case where XB
intersects A's demand curve at point U, the bloc gains KUYV from trade creation but
loses UYZ from trade diversion.  The net impact KUZV is thus likely to be positive (see
Figure 1), though if Z is located to the left of V, the cost of trade diversion  may be larger
than the gain from trade creation.  6In the third case where the export supply curve XB
intersects the horizontal section FK to the left of K, the bloc loses from trade diversion,
with B inefficiently expanding  output and reducing consumption  because of selling in a
protected market. If SB  is parallel to XB,  then the bloc loss is the same in both analyses: it
is equal to JIG.
6  If B is able to satisfy A's pre-PTA import demand M 3 at price Pc (i.e., Z is equal to or to the right of V),
then the bloc gains from the PTA.  The likelihood  of a net gain is higher as U is closer to L, and for a
given U it increases as XB  is less elastic  and DA  is more elastic. For instance, assume KU = UL. Then, if
X, and DA are equally elastic, the export supply curve goes through point V, and the net gain equals
KUV.
13In conclusion,  the effect on the bloc is negative if post-PTA imports from B are
less than M 3, they are likely to be posilive between M3 and M 4, and become increasingly
positive as imports approach M 4, and they are equal to KLV at M4. Given the possibility
of shifting B's exports from C to A, there is a greater likelihood  that the equilibrium will
not be in the negative zone in our analysis than in the standard  one. The likelihood  of
higher imports is further increased in the analysis below (Section 4.2.1.1) when
considering indirect  trade deflection.
Let us return to the "natural trading partner" hypothesis.  Note that the impact of
the PTA on A's welfare is ambiguous.  It is negative for XB  < M3, ambiguous  for M 3 < XB
< M4, and positive for XB = M 4.Note also that, as (post-PTA)  XB  increases,  the PTA's
impact on A's welfare worsens for XEI  < M3, and improves  for M 3 < XB  < M4. However,
the "natural trading partner" hypothesis is specified in terms of pre-PTA trade volumes,
and we have shown that B's pre-PTA  volume of trade with A is indeterminate.  Its volume
is thus unrelated to the PTA's impact on A's welfare or on the bloc's welfare.
Our results so far differ in several ways from the traditional analysis.  First, we
find no relation between initial trade flows (indeterminate)  and a PTA' s welfare effect,
while the standard analysis concludes  to a negative relation. 7 Second, if XB  < M3 in the
post-PTA situation, then the losses to A are larger in our analysis because XB  is larger
than SB  by the amount of pre-PTA exports from B to C which are shifted to B's market
The conclusion in some of the standard studies is in terms of post-PTA trade flows, but there is an
implicit monotonic relationship between pre- and post-PTA trade volumes; a rightward shift in B's
export supply curve in those studies raises  both the pre-PTA and post-PTA  trade volumes.
14after the formation of the PTA. The losses to the bloc are the same in both analyses
(assuming that SB  is parallel to XB) and do not vary with the level of post-PTA imports.
The likelihood  that B is able to satisfy A's import demand at price Pc is greater in our
analysis than in the standard one. Thus, the likelihood that A and the bloc will benefit
from the PTA is larger as well. And the likelihood  is smaller that the export supply curve
XB intersects the horizontal section FK to the left of K where the bloc loses. Thus, from
the bloc's viewpoint, such a PTA is more likely to be beneficial than in standard analysis.
And as examined  below in Section  4.2.1.  1, indirect  trade deflection further increase the
likelihood that the PTA will be beneficial.
Assume now that B is larger than A. Then, A's gains are larger. First, A is likel,y
to gain more on its exports to B. Being larger, B is likely to continue to import from C
after the PTA with A is formed. Since B continues  to charge a tariff on imports from C. A
obtains an improvement  in its terms of trade by selling to B at the higher tariff-inclusive
price.  Second, a larger B is more likely to satisfy A's import demand at the world price.
4.2.1.1. B switches from exporter to C to importer from C.
Rules of origin (ROOs) in FTAs are established  to prevent "trade deflection," that
is, to prevent goods from the rest of the world imported by member countries with the
lowest tariff rates from being resold to partner countries with higher tariff rates. Trade
deflection would render protection in high-tariff countries ineffective, with the effective
tariff equal to the lowest one in the bloc. It would be equivalent  to a CU with the CET set
15equal to the lowest tariff in the union. 8 ROOs were designed  to prevent this. However,
Richardson (1994, 1995)  notes that there is a way around ROOs, a mechanism  he termed
"indirect trade deflection." This is examined  below.
Assume that B can import the good from C, sell these imports  to its own
consumers, and export to A the output that was previously consumed  domestically in B
(assuming B does consume the good). This only takes place if B's import tariff is lower
than A's, and not if the PTA formed between  A and B is a CU rather than a FTA, or if the
PTA is an FTA and B imposes a tariff equal to or higher than A's tariff T.
How likely is it for the legal i:ariff  rate to be lower on exports than on imports?
The relation between the tariff rate and an index Z = (X-M)/(X+M)  was examined for
both Argentina and Brazil in 1992 by tariff line. Note that Z increases with X and
decreases with M, varying from 1 for M = 0 to -1 for X = 0. We found a significantly
negative correlation between the tariff rate and Z in both countries. Thus, the tariff rate
was lower where exports tended to be relatively more important.
Based on these limited findings, the possibility that TB  < T (where TB  is B's tariff
on its imports of the good) and that B might import the good from C for domestic
consumption and increase its exports to A is a realistic possibility. This possibility of
arbitrage between producers in A and B once the PTA is formed increases the likelihood
that equilibrium will be on the horizontal  segment of B's export supply curve. The height
of the horizontal segment depends on the level of tariffs, if any, applied by B on its
imports.
S  This  outcome  is equivalent  to a proposal  made  by  Bhagwati  to strengthen  GATT's  Article  XXIV.  One
difference  is that  high  tariff  countries  lose  all tariff  revenues  under  indirect  trade  deflection.
16How does B's export supply curve to A look in this case? As shown in Figure 2,
by XBB, it has five segments.  As examined  before, it is equal to zero up to point E, and
horizontal at level Pc up to point Z where all exports (volume Xz) forthcoming at that
price are sold in A (and none in C). Beyond point Z, a higher price is needed to elicit a
larger volume of exports from B to A. This is represented by the segment ZY between
prices Pc and Pc + TB At price Pc + TB,  B will import from C for domestic consumption
and sell the output that was consumed  domestically to A. This is shown by the segment
YV, where Xv is B's total output at price P. +  TB.  Finally, beyond Xv, B's export supply
curve is upward sloping again and equals B's output supply.
What difference does the possibility of indirect  trade deflection make in this case?
It makes no difference if TB  = T or if A's import demand intersects B's export supply
curve at point Y or to its left in Figure 2.9  If A's demand curve intersects B's supply
curve to the right of point Y, then indirect trade deflection makes a difference.  For
instance, in Figure 2, B's export supply curve in the absence of indirect  trade deflection,
XB,  intersects A's demand curve in point U---which corresponds  to point U in Figure 1---
while B's export supply curve in the presence of indirect trade deflection,  XBB,  intersects
A's demand curve in point S. Thus, with indirect  trade deflection, A gains area USFG. B
gains ABSY (the tariff revenues on its additional imports) and loses UYFG. The PTA as
a whole gains ABSUY.  Thus, indirect trade deflection by the partner country is beneficial
for the home country and for the PTA as a whole, though not necessarily for the partner
9  Indirect trade deflection may matter even when TB  = T if smuggling takes place between A and B. This
is examined in Schiff (1997) and is abstracted  from here.
17country. Note that if XBB  intersects DA  between U and S, gains are smaller but the
qualitative  results remain unchanged.
On the other hand, if XBB  intersects the horizontal  segment FK to the left of K in
Figure 1, then A loses more, B gains more, and bloc losses are unchanged  (with XB
parallel with XBB).  Thus the impact on bloc welfare of forming a bloc is more likely to be
positive and less likely to be negative once both export switching  and indirect trade
deflection are taken into account. Also, the gains are likely to be larger, while the losses
are likely to be unchanged.
4.2.2. B imports from C.
Assume an FTA with TB  < T.  This case is the one typically considered  in the
regional integration literature with homogeneous  goods.'  Bhagwati and Panagariya
(1996, pp. 48-51) argue that, with indirect  trade deflection, B's export supply curve to A
(SB  in Figure 1) shifts to the right, coinciding  now with B's output supply curve. This
holds for prices higher than Pc + TB,  though not for prices lower than or equal to Pc + TB.
Let us examine B's export supply at prices lower than or equal to Pc + TB.  Since B
imports from C, B's producer price is Pc + TB.  On the other hand, the price it can obtain
in A before formation of the PTA is PC.  Hence, no producer in B will sell in A and B sells
all its output in its own market. In fact, B's export supply to A is zero for prices below Pc
+ TB  (up to point F in Figure 2). It is horizontal at the price Pc + TB  because B can sell its
entire output to A and import its consumption  needs. After that point, B's export supply
'°*  See  the references  at the start  of Section  2.
18curve becomes upward sloping and equals its output supply curve. As in the previous
case,  equilibrium  and  welfare  depend  on where  A's import  demand  curve  and  B's export  supply  curve
intersect.  However,  there  is no link  between  the pre-PTA  trade  volume  and  post-PTA  welfare  since  the pre-
PTA  trade volume  between  A and  B is equal  to zero.
The difference  with the previous case where B is an exporter of the good is that
there is no export switching in this case, and B exports to A only at a price PA>  Pc + TB
rather than at PA>  PC.  There are two possible outcomes.  Either the price is unchanged,
and is the samne  whether B is an exporter or an importer of the good (i.e., PA  =  PC  + T),
with A continuing to import from C and with the welfare effect being the same whether B
is exporter or importer; or the price in A is lower when B is an exporter, with larger gains
from trade creation and smaller losses from trade diversion.  Note also that the latter
situation is more likely to prevail when B is an exporter rather than an importer. The bloc
is thus likely to do better in the case where B is an exporter.
4.3. Small (Large) in partner's (outside)  market.
A forms a PTA with C. If B exports to C, B's exports to A are indeterminate
before the PTA is formned.  Once it is formed, B only sells to C at Pc (rather than at Pc - T
in A). B and C are unaffected  and A gains KLV. If B imports from C, it does not sell to
A either before or after the PTA. Once again, B and C are unaffected  and A gains KLV.
195. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
This paper does not ask whether a country should form or join a trading bloc."
Rather, it asks: If a country has decided to form or join a trading bloc, what partner or
partners should it select? As the paper has shown, the pre-PTA volume of trade is not a
useful criterion for selecting a partner. The reason is that the pre-PTA volume is equal to
zero if the partner is an importer of the good sold to the home country and it is
indeterminate if the partner is an exporter of that good.
Thus, one cannot conclusively  argue, as done by adherents of the "natural trading
partner" hypothesis, that the welfare impact of a PTA is higher if member countries trade
disproportionately  with each other before the PTA is formed. However, neither can one
conclusively  argue the opposite (as done by opponents of the hypothesis), namely that the
welfare impact is worse if member countries already trade disproportionately  with each
other before the PTA is formned.
Some of the conclusions  fromL  our analysis  are as follows:
For given tariff rates, the home country is better off if the partner country is large.
First, a large partner is more likely to satisfy the home country's import demand at the
world price. Second, the home country is likely to gain more on its exports to the partner.
The reason is that if the partner is large, it is likely to continue to import from the world
market after the PTA is formed. And.  since the partner charges a tariff on imports from the
world market, the home country is more likely to obtain an improvement  in its terms of
trade by selling to the partner at the higher tariff-inclusive  price if the partner is large.
Neither does it examine the issue of whether a country should liberalize  regionally or multilaterally.
On the systemic issue of regionalism versus  multilateralism, see Winters (1996).
20Second, the PTA as a whole is likely to be better off if each country imports what
the other exports (rather than each country  importing what the other imports). Losses are
similar but less likely, while gains are both more likely and the same or larger.
Based on these conclusions,  I propose to define the term "natural trading partners"
as a situation characterized  by complementarity  in trade rather than by substitutability.  In
other words, countries are defined as "natural trading partners" if they tend to import
what the prospective partner exports. Under that definition, the "natural trading partner"
hypothesis is likely to hold." 2
2  Wonnacott and Lutz (1989) consider  whether members are competitive or complementary (p. 70),
though their definition differs from ours. For instance,  they consider  the possibility  of an industry being
protected in both member countries, with both import-substitutes  being complementary  to each other.
Panagariya (1997, p. 473) notes Wonnacott  and Lutz's definition  and their statement that this definition
is "much more difficult to evaluate." He chooses not to examine it because  the definition  has not been a
part of the subsequent literature.
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